Introduction
The rise of Asia and the rise of Asia-Pacific regionalism may be considered as the two main trends determining future of the Asia-Pacific region and the evolution of the global economy and the international system. The speedy growth of China and other developing countries of the region has already accelerated the largest redistribution of global wealth and power in history -probably even more significant than the loss of the Chinese economic supremacy in the 19th century. However, along with the impressive growth of per capita and national income in countries which just a half-century ago were plunged into poverty and social disorder, this process produces certain negative political consequences. The rise of the economic potentials changes the regional balance of power, while the emerging security threats are challenging regional economic development.
Among these, the current Sino-American contradictions are without doubt the most important. Rise of China and the US 'Pivot to Asia' have triggered competition between the two main powers in the Asia-Pacific region. This potential rivalry produces a set of political risks for international stability both on the regional and global scales. While the preservation of economic growth remains an uncontested condition for the further successful integration of China into the international system as a responsible player, at the same time growing Chinese economic potential is becoming the main challenge to US regional supremacy, making certain tensions unavoidable.
The rise of Asia-Pacific regionalism may be considered a response to this contradiction.
The development of a regional institutional framework is required to smooth potential tensions and strengthen intra-regional cooperation. The dynamics and logic of the regional economic development-trade and investment within the region has been growing permanently since the Asian crisis of 1997-makes Asia-Pacific regionalism in the economic dimension an objective and influential process rather than just a policy. However, recent trends in regional institution building means it is a much more complex process, whose logic is determined by political factors rather than economic ones.
This article focuses on the contradiction between the dynamics of these two processes:
rising Asia-Pacific regionalism and the political and economic competition between the US and China. Our view is based on the assumption that mutually influencing each other, these two trends undergo certain deformations, both positive and negative. While the institutionalization of multi-and bilateral economic cooperation has shown its potential to smooth Sino-American rivalry, preventing it from slipping into a strategic confrontation, the process of regionalism itself is becoming a field of competition.
Asia-Pacific regionalism: sources and contemporary trends
We can define modern regionalism as one of the distinctive features of contemporary international relations and economics. Despite the rising interest in this problem there is no clear consensus on what constitutes a region and what therefore constitutes regionalization and regionalism.
Regions are usually defined as "an area, especially part of… the world having definable characteristics but not always fixed boundaries" 4 . In the case of international relations, it usually means a number of geographically close countries with certain political and economic relations.
Regionalization and regionalism imply the existence of strong economic, social and political ties within a group of states which produce a high level of interdependency and drive them to specify or establish certain norms and rules within their group. Regionalism does not always correlate with a geographical location. While geographically East Asia includes countries of Southeast Asia, China, South and North Korea and Japan, it is difficult and unreasonable to exclude from East Asian regionalism Australia and New Zealand, taking into account the high level of cooperation between them. The absence of clear regional borders produces the problem of how wide the regional institutional framework should be.
The lack of conceptualization in defining and differentiating "regionalization" and "regionalism" is another theoretical challenge. A variety of concepts suggest regionalization as a feature of regionalism 5 or propose a wider definition of regionalization, as "a process that engages actors" which actually makes regionalization both a political and economic process, while regionalism is only a process involving institutionalization practices 6 .
A variety of scholars define regionalization as a "process driven by economic and social forces", while regionalism is considered to be a political process based on institution building and the creation of intergovernmental organizations at the highest level 7 . From this point of view, regionalism is a set of political practices involving institution building on a regional scale, based on a process of regionalization, which creates the economic foundations for political interaction. Such a conceptualization based on the separation of two dimensions-economic (regionalization) and political (regionalism)-is reasonable and shared by most researchers. We use this approach in this paper. At that time the structuring of regional politics was determined by the rivalry between the two superpowers. In some cases, it cleft the region and some countries; the problem of two The key issue of regionalism, which determines the demand for institution building, is that "shared prosperity" also means "shared risk". Chaotic interdependence may be interpreted as a threat rather than a desirable condition for the international system. While economic cooperation remains the most important driver of strengthening economic and political ties within the region, this process is poorly structured. Establishing clear norms and rules of cooperation in the region and the tools of coordination of international efforts to face challenges to regional security and prosperity is the formal side of the regionalism, which has not kept up with economic development and political change. As global institutions are not designed to deal with specific regional challenges, regionalism is the only option to guarantee stability and economic growth. It makes regionalism an objective process rather than a policy. The rapid development of regionalism reflects the rising importance of qualitative international institutions to ensure economic growth for both developing and developed countries. The survey shows that despite the global recession, demand for free-trade remains relatively high in the Asia-Pacific region. Other forms of regionalism, such as dialogues on the macroeconomic, monetary and exchange rate policies could not be the basis for the creation of a regional institutional framework, while the establishment of an economic community is simply impossible without a regional FTA. At the same time, the survey shows relatively weak support for closer forms of integration, such as monetary or political union.
In these circumstances the satisfaction of the regional demand for institutions becomes essential to regional politics. While closer political cooperation and security remains questionable areas for institution building, the institutionalization of economic cooperation perfectly matches the mood of the regional elites-partly to counter the transformation of the economic dimension into the main field of Sino-American and other regional competition. Since However, at present China's economic growth is declining: it went up to 14% in 2007 and after that showed a downward trend (now it is approximately 7-7,5%) 20 . Value-added industrial output in China reached a 6-year low in August 2014 rising only 6,9% from a year earlier and below economists' estimation of 8,7% growth 21 . Despite these facts, China's growth is still much higher than in most developed countries including the USA. This explains China's high potential and creates the basis for the growth of economic and political influence. The on-going processes and shifts may lead to serious changes in the roles of the USA and the China in the world. As Christopher Layne highlighted: "Historically the emergence of new roles of power in the international system has been geopolitically destabilizing […] 34 . These facts can be considered evidence that China is acting as a more responsible partner and has the idea of strengthening its leadership not only through economic ties but also through ideology.
China also has become an active part of newly created alternative regulating institutions, such as BRICS, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and others. This makes the rivalry even worse: the appearance of alternative institutions means that the previous order is not efficient while the US tries to prove the opposite.
Due to Sino-American economic interdependence China's transition to a slower and more balanced domestic growth can be considered a challenge for the US. As the slowdown is mainly Launching the TTP, Washington aimed at filling an institutional vacuum, fulfilling its role as the leader of global and regional trade liberalization. This strategy perfectly correlates with rising Asian regionalism and the huge demand for the regional institutions. However, to succeed as a basis for the FTAAP, or more broadly, as an institutional framework for the regional economic order, the TTP has to overcome the political contradictions, produced by rise of China and ASEAN powers and the decline of the US as the leading regional power.
Filling the vacuum: tracks of the Asia-Pacific regionalism
In the 90s the idea of FTAAP was driven by economic calculations and a mutually shared understanding that the neoliberal US-led order had no alternatives. That allowed the US to more or less easily promote their views on global and regional intuitional architecture and policies.
Becoming a WTO member in 2001 China consciously joined the US-led global economic order in one of the most important aspects-free-trade.
From the US perspective as the leader of the trade liberalization process, the TTP is a call to further improvements in the international trade regime after decline of the Doha-round.
Refocusing from the global level to the regional level, Washington aimed to kill three birds with one shot: "rebalance" China in the Asia-Pacific region, meet the demands for institution building and fulfil the US global role to promote free-trade policies and regimes. Developing the WTO on a regional scale, the TTP agreement covers such areas as electronic trade, intellectual property rights (IPR), financial markets and even some general rules for economic policy related to international trade, including a variety of non-tariff measures of protectionism. China has the largest demand for infrastructure investment; about 80% of the total amount for East and Southeast Asia and almost half of the total demand of the Asia-Pacific However, both projects are controversial and cause many contradictions for the countries considered prospective participants of these initiatives. One of the strongest barriers for Japan is its agricultural policy: although this sector contributes only about 1.5% of Japan's GDP and the number of farmers is declining as their average age is about 60, it causes many political debates on the TTP issue. 47 In the US in June for the third time this year, 75% of the members of House Democratic Caucus have written to the president, rejecting the current framework of the TransPacific Partnership. 48 The most significant problem is that there is no consensus about these initiatives even in the countries which lead these initiatives.
Simultaneously, for small Asian countries these two competing projects create the possibility of a bargaining strategy in bilateral (and multilateral) negotiations between the US and China and whether their realisation is inevitable or not, try to find the best conditions for economic relations between the parties. Launching TTP, Washington, as the leader of the global trade liberalization, aimed to fill an institutional vacuum . This strategy perfectly correlates with rising Asian regionalism and a huge demand for regional institutions. However, to succeed as a basis for the Asia-Pacific FTA, or more broadly, as an institutional framework for the regional economic order, TTP has to overcome political contradictions produced by the rise of China and ASEAN powers and the decline of the US as the leading regional power. However, is it difficult to imagine a common economic order that excludes China, the most powerful country in Asia-Pacific after the US, so the perspectives of both initiatives seem weak. China's growing assertiveness in international affairs and the US 'Pivot to Asia' has resulted in tensions that are having a negative effect on economic cooperation boosted by Asian regionalism and the influence its institutional framework. The rise of China and relative decline of US regional power and their desire to protect its current position can be seen in many aspects of their cooperation both in economic and political fields.
Sino-American rivalry has also provoked a power shift which is reshaping the relations between all the regional actors. This is vividly seen in the examples of the TTP and RCEP initiatives. Unlike most projects of European integration, these current Asian integration initiatives are presented as two competing and sometimes even 'mutually destroying' projects.
They are based on different principles, they differ in participants and the rules they are looking to implement.
Thus, both processes have become structural challenges to TPP and RCEP, accelerating other regional contradictions: a gap between developed and developing countries and trade disputes among developed ones. In this context both initiatives may become a factor for the regional division rather than consolidation.
However, institution building, to improve the regional security and set up clear rules and norms of economic cooperation, also conceals threats to regional stability. The institutionalization of trade and investment regimes means the institutionalization of a certain economic order which may be advantageous for one party, while unacceptable for another. Here economic calculations may give way to political ambitions. The confident and vigorous leadership of one or another group of powers can suppress or resolve most of contradictions.
However, in terms of the redistribution of power in the Asia-Pacific region the process, calling for the strengthening of ties between the countries of the region, may become a factor of instability, rather than stability.
